Epistemology and Theory of Knowledge: "A Linguistic Approach to the Meaning and Uses of the Two Concepts"

Abstract

The term "epistemology" emerged alongside the concept of the theory of knowledge in ancient philosophies, particularly American and German philosophies. Americans and Germans did not differentiate between the two concepts and used them interchangeably to address philosophical problems. This matter is the domain of philosophers, who are solely responsible for clarifying and explaining it. But can linguistic problems be addressed in light of the two concepts, assuming their semantic and usage equivalence?

The correct view is that the two concepts are different from each other—from the Arabic linguistic perspective—in terms of structure and usage environment. While the structure is clear and does not require much contemplation, the usage environment needs urgent clarification. The term "epistemology" is used independently of the theory of knowledge in the linguistic environment, whereas religious studies equate the two concepts to the point of merging them in some cases. It appears that the reason for this usage is the insistence on conveying the intended meaning to the receiver without confusing them with terminological ambiguity and overlapping usages. This approach does not hold in linguistic studies, or rather, it cannot be consistent; because the goal of linguistics is to pinpoint the precise meaning of the term, with attention to the communicative aspect of using that meaning. Therefore, the two terms are linguistically different, whether the difference is at the level of the field or the subject.

They differ in the field despite their proximity in the subject. In addition to the semantic and usage differences between the two concepts, epistemology provides a broader scope than the theory of knowledge for researchers in the sciences. Hence, it is necessary to examine these two concepts and give each its due study and research to clarify the correctness of terminological usage in academic treatments.